<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en_US"><generator uri="https://jekyllrb.com/" version="4.4.1">Jekyll</generator><link href="https://tom-cui.com//feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" /><link href="https://tom-cui.com//" rel="alternate" type="text/html" hreflang="en_US" /><updated>2026-02-27T19:54:02+00:00</updated><id>https://tom-cui.com//feed.xml</id><title type="html">Tom Cui</title><subtitle>Personal Webpage</subtitle><author><name>Tom Cui</name><email>ttfcui@wharton.edu</email></author><entry><title type="html">Taming the Growth Machine: The Long-Run Consequences of Federal Urban Planning Assistance (Job Market Paper, with Bressler)</title><link href="https://tom-cui.com//2025/11/03/Section-701.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Taming the Growth Machine: The Long-Run Consequences of Federal Urban Planning Assistance (Job Market Paper, with Bressler)" /><published>2025-11-03T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2025-11-03T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://tom-cui.com//2025/11/03/Section-701</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://tom-cui.com//2025/11/03/Section-701.html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Joint with &lt;a href=&quot;https://beaubressler.github.io/research/&quot;&gt;Beau Bressler (UC Davis)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/assets/pdfs/BresslerCui_701_draft.pdf&quot;&gt;Latest draft&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/assets/pdfs/BresslerCui_701_appx.pdf&quot;&gt;Online Appendix&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;details&gt;
    &lt;summary&gt;&lt;b&gt;Abstract&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/summary&gt;
    
We study how the federal Urban Planning Assistance Program, which subsidized growing
communities in the 1960s to hire urban planners to draft land-use plans, affected
housing supply. Using newly digitized records merged with panel data across
municipalities on housing and zoning outcomes, we exploit eligibility thresholds
and capacity to approve funds across state agencies to identify effects. Planning
assistance caused municipalities to build 20\% fewer housing units per decade over
the 50 years that followed. Regulatory innovation steered construction in assisted
areas away from apartments and toward larger single-family homes. Textual evidence
related to zoning and development politics further shows that, since the 1980s,
assisted communities have disincentivized housing supply by passing on development
costs to developers.  These findings suggest that federal intervention in planning
helped institutionalize practices that complicate community growth, with
subsequent consequences for national housing affordability.

&lt;/details&gt;</content><author><name>Tom Cui</name><email>ttfcui@wharton.edu</email></author><summary type="html">Joint with Beau Bressler (UC Davis)</summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://tom-cui.com//assets/img/Section_701_preview.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://tom-cui.com//assets/img/Section_701_preview.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Are Zoning District Borders Color Lines? How Lot Size Requirements Alter Neighborhood Racial Composition (with Been)</title><link href="https://tom-cui.com//2024/09/30/LotsDisconts.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Are Zoning District Borders Color Lines? How Lot Size Requirements Alter Neighborhood Racial Composition (with Been)" /><published>2024-09-30T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2024-09-30T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://tom-cui.com//2024/09/30/LotsDisconts</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://tom-cui.com//2024/09/30/LotsDisconts.html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Joint with Vicki Been (NYU)&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/assets/pdfs/LotsDisconts_Latest.pdf&quot;&gt;Latest draft&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/assets/pdfs/LotsDisconts_Latest_Appx.pdf&quot;&gt;Online Appendix&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;details&gt;
    &lt;summary&gt;&lt;b&gt;Abstract&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/summary&gt;
    
We study how minimum lot size (MLS) requirements affected the racial composition of
neighborhoods since 1980.  We generate a new database of the borders within local
governments where we predict changes in lot size requirements. Applying dynamic
border discontinuity designs over the national database, we produce causal estimates
that vary over the regulations&apos; particular characteristics. Data-driven clustering
identifies which of the regulations most impact racial diversity: MLS requirements
that are at least 5000 square feet larger than prevailing density patterns nearby,
lowering allowed density by 3 units/acre. Our results show that those requirements
persistently stymied racial integration over the following decades. 

&lt;/details&gt;</content><author><name>Tom Cui</name><email>ttfcui@wharton.edu</email></author><summary type="html">Joint with Vicki Been (NYU)</summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://tom-cui.com//assets/img/LotsDisconts_preview.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://tom-cui.com//assets/img/LotsDisconts_preview.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Did Race Fence Off The American City? The Great Migration and the Evolution of Exclusionary Zoning</title><link href="https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/30/Lots50s.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Did Race Fence Off The American City? The Great Migration and the Evolution of Exclusionary Zoning" /><published>2022-09-30T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2022-09-30T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/30/Lots50s</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/30/Lots50s.html">&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/assets/pdfs/LotsEZ_Latest.pdf&quot;&gt;Latest draft&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;
    &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/assets/pdfs/LotsEZ_Latest_Appx.pdf&quot;&gt;Online Appendix&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;details&gt;
    &lt;summary&gt;&lt;b&gt;Abstract&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/summary&gt;
    
    I study how postwar Black migration caused American cities&apos; suburbs to widely
    restrict development with minimum lot sizes. When local governments use lot size regulations
    to restrict the supply of dense housing, bunching is detectable across lot size distributions.
    I develop an algorithm to measure bunching and produce a national panel for the regulation
    spanning the 20th Century. Most suburbs adopted lot size controls from 1945--1970,
    all the while Black Americans left the South for economic opportunity. I find the Great
    Migration of Black Americans into non-Southern cities accelerated minimum lot size
    adoption and caused up to half of baseline lot size restrictiveness. Migration of
    poorer white Americans cause null or small negative effects. A sizable driver of
    the Great Migration effect is local implementation of school desegregation before 1970.
    The results support a theory where competition in policy planning still reinforced a
    minority group&apos;s exclusion from local public goods.
    As homes remain in place longer than their first owners, past lot size restrictiveness
    can explain today&apos;s spatial disparities in racial sorting and economic mobility.
  
&lt;/details&gt;</content><author><name>Tom Cui</name><email>ttfcui@wharton.edu</email></author><summary type="html">Latest draft</summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://tom-cui.com//assets/img/Lots50s_preview.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://tom-cui.com//assets/img/Lots50s_preview.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Stimulating Durable Purchases (with Berger, Turner, Zwick)</title><link href="https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/29/FTHB.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Stimulating Durable Purchases (with Berger, Turner, Zwick)" /><published>2022-09-29T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2022-09-29T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/29/FTHB</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/29/FTHB.html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Joint with David Berger, Nicholas Turner and Eric Zwick&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/assets/pdfs/fthb_model_Latest.pdf&quot;&gt;Latest draft&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;details&gt;
    &lt;summary&gt;&lt;b&gt;Abstract&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/summary&gt;
    This paper uses a benchmark life-cycle model with incomplete markets and durable
    consumption as a laboratory to investigate the design of fiscal stimulus. We
    calibrate the model to match microdata moments from standard sources,
    administrative data on homeownership transitions, and quasi-experimental
    estimates from the First-Time Homebuyer Credit in the U.S. We present three
    results. First, frictions that limit agents&apos; ability to smooth durable purchases
    over time are crucial to reconciling competing empirical findings. 
    With liquidity constraints and fixed adjustment costs, the standard real-business-cycle
    intuition that responses should quickly reverse no longer holds.
    A first-time homebuying subsidy that can be applied to the down
    payment induces a response that persists over many years. 
    This persistence arises because the subsidy enables young, constrained agents to
    transition to homeownership several years earlier than they otherwise would have
    and because homes are a better store of value than other durables. 
    Second, whereas in standard
    models the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of cash transfers declines
    rapidly with the size of a cash transfer, we find a much slower decline in our
    baseline model, with durable goods adjustments driving the result. Finally, we
    combine the model with techniques from the public finance literature 
    to assess welfare implications of alternative durable stimulus and cash transfers.
    Large fiscal or welfare spillovers are
    necessary for targeted durable subsidies to match the benefits of unconditional
    cash transfers.
&lt;/details&gt;</content><author><name>Tom Cui</name><email>ttfcui@wharton.edu</email></author><summary type="html">Joint with David Berger, Nicholas Turner and Eric Zwick</summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://tom-cui.com//assets/img/fthb_preview.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://tom-cui.com//assets/img/fthb_preview.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Measuring Pro-housing Reforms at Scale</title><link href="https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/28/landevals.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Measuring Pro-housing Reforms at Scale" /><published>2022-09-28T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2022-09-28T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/28/landevals</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/28/landevals.html">&lt;ul&gt;
  &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.mercatus.org/research/research-papers/measuring-pro-housing-reforms&quot;&gt;Released version (Mercatus link)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;details&gt;
    &lt;summary&gt;&lt;b&gt;Abstract&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/summary&gt;

To increase housing supply and housing affordability across the United States, state and local governments have started experimenting with a menu of pro- housing reforms. If politicians and planners adopt certain reforms, how can they best monitor their effectiveness at providing affordable housing? This paper outlines how those practitioners can use data for housing policy evalu- ation, from determining what to study to understanding the research methods used by outside experts. To illustrate recommendations, I use frontier empirical research in urban economics and recent data collection successes by government agencies. This paper offers a standardized reform evaluation plan that can speed up the production of knowledge about which reforms work in different market conditions.

&lt;/details&gt;</content><author><name>Tom Cui</name><email>ttfcui@wharton.edu</email></author><summary type="html">Released version (Mercatus link)</summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://tom-cui.com//assets/img/LotsEvals_preview.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://tom-cui.com//assets/img/LotsEvals_preview.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Housing Segments and Segmented Remodeling</title><link href="https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/28/remodels.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Housing Segments and Segmented Remodeling" /><published>2022-09-28T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2022-09-28T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/28/remodels</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/28/remodels.html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Major revision in progress; please e-mail for the latest draft&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;details&gt;
    &lt;summary&gt;&lt;b&gt;Abstract&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/summary&gt;

    In 2019, home remodeling and improvement accounted for over $400 billion in
    annual U.S. investment. I show that this sizable investment in remodeling is
    also segmented investment: investment concentrates in the right tail of major remodels.
    Households making major remodels live in higher-quality homes within a housing market,
    as defined by their self-reported home values. Preliminary results show remodeling is
    both procyclical and price elastic, but that price elasticities vary between households with
    different mortgage payment-to-income ratios. A rise in house price indices by one percent
    raises remodeling propensities as much as a percentage point rise in leverage decreases them.
    These facts suggest credit markets play a key role in directing remodeling activity
    toward providing affordable housing stock and not toward properties held for investment purposes.

&lt;/details&gt;</content><author><name>Tom Cui</name><email>ttfcui@wharton.edu</email></author><summary type="html">Major revision in progress; please e-mail for the latest draft</summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://tom-cui.com//assets/img/remodelling_preview.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://tom-cui.com//assets/img/remodelling_preview.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Teaching Experience</title><link href="https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/27/teaching.html" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Teaching Experience" /><published>2022-09-27T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2022-09-27T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/27/teaching</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://tom-cui.com//2022/09/27/teaching.html">&lt;h4 id=&quot;teaching-fellow-for-wharton-courses&quot;&gt;Teaching fellow for Wharton courses:&lt;/h4&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;REAL 208/708: Housing Markets&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;em&gt;Spring 2020–Spring 2022&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;details&gt;
    &lt;summary&gt;Details&lt;/summary&gt;
    
    This course is designed for students interested in the economics and operations
    of housing markets. It is primarily a U.S. focused course, but does include
    a limited amount of international material for comparative purposes. The
    class is divided into four sections: (1) supply and demand for housing,
    including the operations of homebuilders and rental landlords; (2) house prices,
    including cycles and price dynamics; (3) international comparisons; and 
    (4) public policy analysis applied to a current housing markets-related issue.
&lt;/details&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;MGEC 611/612: Microeconomics For Managers&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;em&gt;Fall 2018–Fall 2021&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;details&gt;
    &lt;summary&gt;Details&lt;/summary&gt;
    
    (611) This course establishes the micro-economic foundations for understanding
    business decision-making. The course will cover consumer theory and market demand,
    production theory, perfectly competitive and monopoly markets and game theory.&lt;br /&gt;
    (612) This course will cover the economic foundations of business strategy and
    decision-making in market environments with other strategic actors and less than
    full information, as well as advanced pricing strategies.
&lt;/details&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;BEPP 230: Urban Fiscal Policy&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;em&gt;Fall 2019&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;details&gt;
    &lt;summary&gt;Details&lt;/summary&gt;

    This course will examine the provision of public services for firms and people
    through cities. Why cities exist, when fiscal policy fails, investments in
    infrastructure, realities of local governments such as inequality, crime,
    corruption, high cost of living, congestion, and unfunded pensions and debt,
    will be covered. We will pay special attention to recent topics, such as
    partnerships with the private sector, enterprise zones, the role of technology,
    environmental challenges, and real estate policies that promote housing
    affordability, such as rent control and inclusionary zoning. 
&lt;/details&gt;</content><author><name>Tom Cui</name><email>ttfcui@wharton.edu</email></author><summary type="html">Teaching fellow for Wharton courses:</summary></entry></feed>